Security¶
What the container trusts¶
| Input | Trust level | Why |
|---|---|---|
MULTICA_TOKEN |
Secret | Full access to the workspaces the token can reach |
AI_API_KEY |
Secret | Billable access to the model endpoint |
GH_TOKEN |
Secret | Repository access, often write |
| Task instructions | Untrusted content | A prompt injection can ask the agent to exfiltrate anything the container can read |
The agent runs arbitrary code by design. Treat the container as a sandbox for convenience, not as a security boundary against a malicious task. The token you give it is the blast radius.
Practical consequences:
- Use a Multica token scoped to the workspaces the runtime needs.
- Use a GitHub token scoped to the repositories the agent is allowed to touch.
- Do not mount a host directory that contains unrelated credentials.
- Do not run the autoscaler's Docker socket mount on a host where tasks are untrusted; the socket is root-equivalent.
Secrets handling¶
- No secret is baked into an image layer. Everything arrives as an environment variable or an orchestrator secret at runtime.
- The OpenCode config contains the API key and is written at start with mode
0600under the runner's home. - The banner never prints a token, key, or full router URL (only scheme + host).
.envis git-ignored;.env.examplecontains empty placeholders.- ECS task definitions reference Secrets Manager ARNs, not values.
If a key leaks: rotate it at the provider, then restart the runtime. The old key is not recoverable from the image, but it may be in logs if you printed it yourself.
Non-root¶
Everything runs as runner (uid/gid 1000):
- the Multica daemon, both agent CLIs, and every task;
- Xvfb and the Penpot MCP server in the design image;
- MariaDB, PostgreSQL and Redis in the PHP image.
There is no sudo, no setuid helper, and no runtime privilege drop. This keeps
the image compatible with Fargate's seccomp profile and with Kubernetes
runAsNonRoot.
Network¶
- No inbound port. The runtime connects out; it does not listen for tasks.
- Egress should be restricted to what the runtime needs: Multica, the AI router, your Git host, and the package registries your tasks use. A coding agent needs broad egress in practice; an allowlist is a policy decision, not a default.
- The design image binds MCP and plugin servers to
127.0.0.1by default. Change the host variables only if you deliberately want them reachable.
Supply chain¶
- Base OS, Node, and every tool are pinned in
versions.env. - Downloads are checksum-verified where upstream publishes a checksum.
- Images are built in GitHub Actions, not on a laptop, and published to GHCR with provenance and SBOM attestations.
- Dependencies are updated by Dependabot PRs; a human reviews the diff and the resulting image.
For high-assurance deployments:
docker pull ghcr.io/proreka/multica-runtime@sha256:<digest>
Pin the digest, not the tag. Tags are mutable; digests are not.
What is deliberately not done¶
- No auto-update of agent CLIs. An in-place update would change behaviour mid-task and bypass review.
- No Docker socket except the Swarm autoscaler. The ECS adapter uses IAM.
- No privileged mode, no host PID/network, no
--cap-add. - No secrets in build args. Build args are visible in image history.
Reporting a vulnerability¶
Please do not open a public issue for a security problem. See SECURITY.md for the private reporting channel and response expectations.